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THE INJURIES COVERED
WILLM C. HAIRTMAN*
In the Workmen's Compensation Act the legislature has defined
the word "injury" as follows: "" 'Injury' includes any injury received
in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employ-
ment."1
It is clear from the above statutory definition that to maintain a
workmen's compensation claim for an injury -three conditions must be
met:
(a) There must be an injury;
(b) The injury must be received in the course of the in-
jured employee's employment; and
(c) The injury must arise out of his employment.
Failure of the facts -to satisfy all three statutory requirements takes the
claim outside the legislative definition of an "injury" and consequently
outside the coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The case law on what injuries are covered by the act has developed
entirely around the above three statutory requirements. The limits of
this article do not permit an analysis of all the Ohio Supreme Court cases
which have considered the meaning and construction of the term "in-
jury." In general, only those decisions since the 1937 amendment of the
statutory definition of injury will be considered.'
CoNs-TIucTioN OF "INJURY"
To a physician an "injury" means any bodily harm and to him an
"accidental injury" means any sudden and unexpected bodily harm, such
as a cerebral vascular accident. One of the purposes of this article is to
determine whether the term "injury" as used in the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act has the same broad meaning.
Judicially, the meaning of the word "injury" as used in the act has
varied little over the years, but considerable confusion has been caused
in the application of the judicial interpretation of this word to the facts
presented in various cases. The first definition of this word by the Ohio
Supreme Court is found in State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer,' decided in
1912, where the court said:
It [the Workmen's Compensation Act] provides a plan of
compensation for injuries, wilfully not self inflicted, resulting
*Of the firm of Squire, Sanders and Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio; member of
the Ohio Bar.
1 OHIO REV. CODE § 4123.01(C) (1953).
2The 1937 amendment is considered pp. 567-71 infra.
3 SS Ohio St. 349, 97 N.E. 602 (1912).
INJURIES
from accidents to employes of employers ... . (Emphasis
added.)
One of the important decisions after the 1937 amendment was
Reynolds v. Industrial Comm'n, 5 where the plaintiff in doing his work
was required over a period of about three months to use a heavy pneu-
matic air hammer while occupying a cramped position. He testified that
while so working: "I broke down . . . something took hold of me. I
thought it was rheumatism."' The Ohio Supreme Court after referring
to the definition of injury as contained in Malone v. Industrial Comm'n,
stated in its opinion: "It will be readily seen that nothing occurred to the
appellee within the purview of such statement which would constitute
an accidental injury."8
In Gerich v. Republic Steel Corp.,9 the decedent was engaged,
along with others, in pushing a cart filled with tools up a slightly in-
clined railroad track. He suddenly collapsed while so working. The
supreme court, noting that there was no evidence that any accidental or
unusual incident had occurred, held that the death was not compensable.'0
In Nelson v. Industrial Comm'n, the plaintiff's decedent suffered
a cerebral hemorrhage while working in a crouched position. The su-
preme court held that decedent had not sustained an accidental injury
with respect to his crouched position. The court mentioned that this was
the position most convenient and further commented:
In every muscular movement there is stress and strain, but,
unless there is something unusual or out of the ordinary in the
manner of doing his work, which a person is either forced to
undergo or undergoes voluntarily, his death is not compensable
when he dies from a condition which has long been with him.
It is common knowledge that, where physical conditions pre-
vail, as in the case of decedent, death from cerebral hemor-
rhage occurs to people at work, in their offices, on the street,
at home or in bed.' 2
The most recent supreme court definition of the word "injury"
4 Id. at 386, 97 N.E. at 603.
5 145 Ohio St. 389, 61 N.E.2d 784 (1945).
6 Id. at 390, 61 N.E.2d at 784.
7140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E.2d 266 (1942). See discussion pp. 569-70 infra.
8 145 Ohio St. 389, 391, 61 N.E.2d 784 (1945).
9 153 Ohio St. 463, 92 N.E.2d 393 (1950).10The court stated in its opinion: "Evidence which shows simply that an in-
jury either may have been a result of an accidental impact arising out of and in
the course of employment or may have been suffered in the course of employment
in the regular course of nature in the usual and normal activities of the employ-
ment is not evidence to support a compensation claim." Id. at 468, 92 N.E.2d at 396.
11150 Ohio St. 1, 80 N.E.2d 430 (1948).
32 Id. at 9, 80 N.E.2d at 434-35.
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appears in the first paragraph of the syllabus in Drpps v. Industrial
Comm'n,' a where compensable injury is defined as follows:
The term, "injury", as used in the Ohio Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, comprehends a physical or traumatic damage or
harm accidental in character and as a result of external and
accidental means in the sense of being the result of a sudden
mishap, occurring by chance, unexpectedly and not in the usual
course of events, at a particular time and place.
All that the DriMs case has added is a clearer explanation of the
requirement that the injury be accidental. This case firmly establishes
the principle that in order for an injury to be compensable it must be
the result of an accidental cause or means and it is not sufficient that the
result be unexpected or accidental. Because the equipment on which
Mr. Dripps was working had become unbalanced and twisted, he had
been required for some nine weeks to exert a greater pull on a line.
While so pulling, he suddenly and unexpectedly sustained "a strain in
the left arm which has been determined to be a traumatic disturbance
of the brachial plexis."'14 The result was accidental. That this is not
sufficient to constitute a compensable injury is made clear by the lan-
guage of the second paragraph of the syllabus which reads:
The fact that a workman is injured by exerting more effort or
being subjected to a greater strain than is customary in the
performance of his work is not in and of itself sufficient to
entitle such workman to participate in the State Insurance
Fund; and before such participation may be had it must appear
that such increased effort or strain was occasioned by some
sudden mishap or unusual event.
In defining or construing the word "injury" as used in the act at-
tention should also be given to the case of Artis v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co.i5 Here the plaintiff, because of a shortage of help, was
forced to stack liners on skids to a height of seven feet whereas he
normally stacked them to a height of five feet. While doing this work
he developed a sudden pain in the -back and maintained that having to
reach seven feet rather than five and having to work harder because of
a shortage of help, he was subjected to an unusual condition and that his
injury therefore was a compensable one. The supreme court held other-
wise. In its opinion it cited and approved Matczak v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co.,' 6 where it had held that a compensable injury had not been
13 165 Ohio St. 407, 135 N.E.2d 873 (1956).
14 Id. at 409, 135 N.E.2d at 875.
15 165 Ohio St. 412, 135 N.E.2d 877 (1956).
16 139 Ohio St. 181, 38 N.E.2d 1021 (1942). For a discussion of this case and
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sustained though plaintiff while lifting a bag of material felt a snap or
catch in his back and was subsequently disabled because of back disability.
Support for the position that "injury" means accidental injury can
be found in the Workmen's Compensation Act itself. For example,
Ohio Revised Code section 4123.28 (1953) provides in part:
Every employer in this state shall keep a record of all injuries,
fatal or otherwise, received by his employees in the course of
their employment and resulting in seven days or more of total
disability. Within a week after the occurrence of an accident
resulting in such personal injury, a report thereof shall be
made in writing to the industrial commission. . . . (Emphasis
added.)
In other sections of the act the legislature has used the terms "injury"
and "accident" synonymously.1 7 Recognition of this can be found in
the cases.1 8
others, most of which were decided prior to the 1937 amendment, see Hadley,
When Is An Injury Not An Injury, 25 Ohio Op. 487 (1943).
17 Onro REv. CODE § 4123.22 (1953) (The Commission's annual report shall
contain a statement of the "causes of accidents leading to the injuries."); OHio
REV. CODE § 4123.34(C) (1953) (In determining premium rates the basis shall be
"individual industrial accident experience."); Omo REa. CODE § 4123.17 (1953)
(The Commission can spend money for the investigation and prevention of in-
dustrial accidents.) ; OHIO REa. CODE § 4123.66 (Baldwin Supp. 1958) ("In case an
industrial accident causes damage to artificial teeth" or "in case an industrial acci-
dent which injures an employee also causes damage to the employee's eyeglasses"
the Commission shall pay for the repair or replacement of such denture or eye-
glasses.); OHIO REa. CODE § 4123.519 (Baldwin Supp. 1958) (A decision of the
Industrial Commission in any injury case, other than a decision as to extent of
disability may be appealed "to the court of common pleas of the county in which
the injury was inflicted.").
18 In the Dripps case, supra note 13, Judge Taft said in his concurring
opinion:
"It has been suggested that there is no statutory or constitutional basis for a
conclusion that, in order to be an 'injury' within the meaning of Workmen's
Compensation Act, 'a physical or traumatic damage or harm' must be 'accidental
in its character in the sense of being the result of a sudden mishap occurring by
chance, unexpectedly and not in the usual course of events, at a particular time
and place' (or, in other words, the result of accidental means), instead of being
merely 'accidental in character and result.' See Johnson v. Industrial Commission,
164 Ohio St. 297, 306, 130 N.E.2d 807; Renkel v. Industrial Commission, 109 Ohio
St. 152, 156, 141 N.E. 834. However, there is statutory language which tends to
support the pronouncement of law being made in paragraph one of the syllabus of
the instant case. See for example Section 4123.28 ('accident resulting in . . . in-
jury') and 4123.22 ('accidents leading to injuries for which awards . . . made')
Revised Code."
However, in an earlier decision in Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, supra, the
court said: ". . . This court has often held that, in order to be an 'injury' within
the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 'a physical or traumatic damage
or harm' must be 'accidental in its character in the sense of being the result of a
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A disease cannot constitute an accidental injury. The importance
of this obvious statement can be appreciated when it is realized that only
injury cases can be appealed to court.19
In Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, the decedent while working
was exposed to cold, rainy weather on a particular day. He died of
pneumonia three weeks later. Two physicians testified that there was a
causal relationship between the hazards of decedent's employment on
the day in question and his subsequent pneumonia and death. The court
held that while decedent had contracted a disease which caused his death
a disease could not be an injury as that term is used in the Workmen's
Compensation Act.21
A death occurring on the employer's premises during working hours
is not necessarily compensable.22 An acute dilation of the heart,' a
coronary occlusion,24 a cerebral hemorrhage25 or a coronary thrombosis,2 6
although occurring during the hours of employment, do not necessarily
constitute compensable injuries.
Quaere: What if the disability is caused by an accident but there is
no trauma to the injured man and the entire disability is due to an
emotional reaction? For example, suppose that X, while at work, wit-
nesses a horrible and 'bloody accident which kills Y, a fellow worker.
X goes into shock and has an immediate and damaging impairment of
his mental faculties. If common law tort principles were applied, the
occurrence would not be sufficient to constitute an injury. Similarly,
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, X's injury is probably not
compensable. In an analogous situation in the case of Toth v. Standard
Oil Co.," where an employee was subjected to police investigation on
sudden mishap occurring by chance, unexpectedly and not in the usual course of
events, at a particular time and place.' Malone v. Industrial Commission, supra
(140 Ohio St. 292), paragraph one of syllabus; Toth v. Standard Oil Co., .rupra
(160 Ohio St. 1), paragraph one of syllabus. But see Maynard v. B. F. Goodrich
Co., supra (144 Ohio St. 22). It may be observed that our Constitution and Statutes
apparently do not contain any such 'accidental' requirement. . .
19 OHio REv. CODE § 4123.519 (Baldwin Supp. 1958).
20 See note 18, supra.
21 See also Industrial Comm'n v. Armacost, 129 Ohio St. 176, 194 N.E. 23
(1935) (chemical conjunctivitis); Industrial Comm'n v. Russell, 111 Ohio St. 692,
146 N.E. 305 (1924) (optic atrophy); Renkel v. Industrial Comm'n, 109 Ohio St.
152, 141 N.E. 834 (1923) (tuberculosis) ; Industrial Comm'n v. Cross, 104 Ohio St.
561, 136 N.E. 283 (1922) (typhoid fever); Industrial Comm'n v. Brown, 92 Ohio
St. 309, 110 N.E. 744 (1915) (lead poisoning). But cf., Spicer Mfg. Co. v. Tucker,
127 Ohio St. 421, 188 N.E. 870 (1934) (infection from vaccination).
22 Stanfield v. Industrial Comm'n, 146 Ohio St. 583, 67 N.E.2d 446 (1946).
23 Goodman v. Industrial Comm'n, 135 Ohio St. 81, 19 N.E.2d 508 (1939).
24 Vogt v. Industrial Comm'n, 138 Ohio St. 233, 34 N.E.2d 197 (1941).
25 Cordray v. Industrial Comm'n, 139 Ohio St. 173, 38 N.E.2d 1017 (1942).
26 McNees v. Cincinnati St. Ry., 152 Ohio St. 269, 89 N.E.2d 138 (1949).
27 Davis v. Cleveland Ry., 135 Ohio St. 401, 21 N.E.2d 169 (1939); Miller
v. Baltimore & Ohio S.W.R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1907).
28160 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E.2d 81 (1935).
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suspicion that a truck driven by the employee had injured a pedestrian
and where the employee thereafter suffered partial paralysis from a
cerebral hemorrhage claimed to have been caused -by anxiety and worry
brought on by the investigation, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that
he had not suffered a compensable injury under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act. The court held that it is necessary that the injury be physical
or that there 'be traumatic damage, accidental in character 9 and that
worry and anxiety alone do not constitute an injury.3 0
From the foregoing cases, it is readily apparent that the meaning
of the word "injury" under the act is considerably more restricted than
is the meaning of this word to a physician.
CONSTRUCTION OF "ARISING OUT OF" AND OF "IN THE COURSE OF"
The workmen's compensation laws of some states only require that
an injury suffered by an employee arise out of or occur in the course his
employment. Most states require a showing of both. In any event the
word "and" is used in the Ohio act3 ' and its consequences cannot be
overlooked. Often the language of the decisions refers to course of
employment when a student of the act might feel that the court meant
arising out of the employment. Nevertheless, it is clear that if both
"course of" and "arising out of" cannot be shown, the injury is not
compensable.
Logically, this problem should be approached from the standpoint
of an accidental injury sustained in the course of, but not arising out of,
the employment and accidental injuries arising out of, but not sustained
in the course of the employment. Such a cataloguing of cases would be
time-consuming and not particularly rewarding for often when one or
the other requirement is not met the court makes the blanket statement
the accidental injury is not compensable because it did not arise out of
and was not sustained in the course of the employment. Other times
when it might be urged that the injury arose out of -but was not sustained
in the course of employment, the court expresses the opinion that the
employee's injury did not arise out of the employment or that the em-
ployee left his course of employment.
Even though an employee is injured while working and while
clearly in the course of his employment, the injury does not necessarily
arise out of his employment. This is often the situation in "horseplay"
and fight cases. On the other hand a foreman who while relaxing on
a public beach is hit on the head by a pop bottle thrown by a disgruntled
employee may have 'been injured by an event which arose out of the
29 Id. at 5, 113 N.E.2d at 83.
3OId. at 6-7, 113 N.E.2d at 84. See also McNees v. Cincinnati St. Ry., supra
note 26; Shea v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 139 Ohio St. 407, 40 N.E.2d 669
(1942). But see Ray v. Industrial Comm'n, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 5 (1951).
31 Omo RBy. CoDE § 4123.01 (C) (1953).
1958]
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employment -but the injury clearly did not occur in the course of his
employment.
The most dramatic presentation of the necessity of meeting both the
requirements is found in Georgejakakis v. Wheeling Steel Co. 2 Plaintiff
was hired for limited duties as a laborer. Without necessity, authority,
or apparent reason he attempted to operate a pressing machine and acci-
dentally lost by amputation the fingers of his left hand. In denying
compensation the court said that plaintiff "was injured outside the sphere
of his employment; not through an act which he improperly and un-
authorizedly did within such sphere. '
In general, we will now consider the requirements of "arising out
of" and "in the course of employment" as they are affected by the
various factors such as the place of the accident, the time of the accident,
and the cause of the accident. The cases relating to these requirements
cannot be categorically catalogued for all factors may be pertinent in
the same case.
Normally an employee whose duties have a fixed situs and who is
injured while on the public highway or public sidewalk outside his em-
ployer's premises and while on his way to or from work, is not covered
by the act."4 Although it might be said that in a sense his injury arose
out of his employment, he is not in the course of his employment. There
are exceptions however, even to this rule.3 5 When the injury occurs
within close proximity to the employer's premises, especially when he is
using the normal means of ingress to or egress from the plant, his in-
jury will be compensable if he is found to have entered the zone of his
employment. 86
In Fike v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.3 7 plaintiff was walking on
a public sidewalk alongside of defendant's plant intending to enter a gate
to go to work when he was struck by a vehicle owned by defendant which
was coming out of the plant on its way to the public highway. Plaintiff
sued at common law and on appeal the defendant maintained that the
32 151 Ohio St. 458, 86 N.E.2d 594 (1949).
3 d. at 461, 86 N.E.2d at 595. However, the court stated that a slight or
inconsequential departure will not have the same result. Id. at 460, 86 N.E.2d at
595.
,- 4Stevens v. Industrial Comm'n, 145 Ohio St. 198, 61 N.E.2d 198 (1945);
IndutriaJ .Comm'n v. Gintert, 128 Ohio St. 129, 190 N.E. 400 (1934); Industrial
CoIn'A _v.,,Baker, 127 Ohio St. 345, 188 N.E. 560 (1933); Industrial Comm'n v.
Heil, 123 Qhio St. 604, 176 N.E. 458 (1931); Conrad v. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal
Co., 1'07 Ohio St. 387, 140 N.E. 482 (1923); Fike v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
56-Ohio-'App. 197, 10 N.E.2d 242 (1937).
A_ Smith v. ,Industrial Comm'n, 90 Ohio App. 481, 107 N.E.2d 220 (1948). An
employee- on- 24 hour-call while returning home from an off duty call to the plant
is killed by an automobile while crossing a roadway which separates the plant and
his -homel-eheldf:suhclideath and injury occurred in the course of and arose out of
the employment.'101 ,2 oi.,
3 6 Industia lCorhmnn'n'v. Beuber, 117 Ohio St. 373, 159 N.E. 363 (1927).
37 56 Ohio App. 197, 10 N.E.2d 242 (1937).
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judgment for plaintiff should be reversed because plainiff w at -the
time of the injury within the zone of his employment-and hence limited
to his rights 'under the workmen's compensation law .Judgn t for
plaintiff was affirmed. '
An' accident occurring in a parking lot before the employee 'atually
starts .orking or after 'he finishes work is normally compensable 1 al-
though jt will not be compensable if the injury is due to hazards common
to the general public.' .
Even though the injury occurs at work, the circumstances as to
cause may render it non-compepsable, Food poisoning injuries caused by
a meal eaten on the employer's premises are not compensable.' 1 An, as-
sault by an employee on a co-employee, is r-t covered by the act.42 'But
the rule is to the contrary if the assaulted employee was carrying ,out a
duty of his employment at the time-of the assault and the assault ws
brought about by the performance of such duties. ., -
i The most recent decision dealing with assaults by a fellow employee
is thatof the Franklin County Court of Appeals in Dazes-v, Industriai
2omm'n, 4' The plaintiff's decedentCollin engaged in an-,-argument
with a fellow employee -Washburn over the ability of each as a beer
salesmaq while Collins (in a room ,furnished by thp,, er~ployer), was
filling out his report of his day's work. Uncomplimentary, names were
exchanged and a fight-ensued resultng in injuries to Collins ,which later
proved fatal, In other words, the a rgument led to an altercation, which
resulted in plaintiff's decedent's death. In, its opinion,the court~said;, 'This
work was voluntarily abandoned when he became engaged in the fight
which it appears was a private affair."' The same, rule, applies in-cases
of horseplay. 6
Where in the absence of an accidental cause an employee collapss
and falls at work thereupon injuring himself hecanse of ,the .fall,, his
resulting injury does not arise out of his employment if it -is canus.d by
3H For iethet zone of employment cases tee 42- OHIo JUR. I76kkt'in's-C6mnjen"-
,ration §§ 52, 53 (1936). i. .L I -It J
39 Pickett v. Industrial Comm'n, 98 Ohio App. 372, 129 N.E.2d -639 (1954)
(employer neither -owned -nor -controlled- parking -lot)-;--Kro-vosucky---v.-Industrial
Comm'n, 74 Ohio App, 86, 57 N.E-.2d 607 (1943).,
40 Walborn v.-GeneraI Fireproofing Co.i 147,'Ohio 'St, 507,- 72 N.E.2d 84
(1947). 1 , ,. , 1
-4' Coston v. Carnegie-Illinois Ste el Corp., 69 Ohio L. Abs. 315,' 125 N.E.2d
736 (1952).: But see Seb1k v. Clev;eland;Graphite Bronze Co. 148 -Ohio -St. 690,
76 N.E.2d 89Z'(1947). P
4 2 Brown v. Industrial Commn, 54 Ohio L. Abs. 333 8Z N.E.2d 878 (1948).
43 Industrial Comm'n v. Pora, 10q Ohio St. 218, 125-N.E.-662 (6'699)
44 76 Ohio L. Abs. 474, 148 NE.2d 100 (_1957-. ,
45 Id. at 476, 148 N.E.2d at 101.
46 Industrial Comm'n v. Bankes, 127 Ofiio'St. '517i 180 N.ER. 43 (1934).
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hitting the floor.4 7 But if the resulting injury is because of hitting ma-
chinery or equipment, it is compensable.
48
Injuries caused -by an act of God are generally recognized as being
non-compensgble.
49
Injuries sustained while the employee is away from the employer's
physical place of business such as injuries to traveling salesmen and em-
ployees attending conventions may or may not be compensable, depending
upon what the employee was doing at the time of the injury, where the
injury occurred, and other such factors.
In Bower v. Industrial Comm'n,5 ° a school teacher attending an
institute in a city foreign to her place of teaching was held entitled to
compensation, where she received an injury as a result of an automobile
accident which occurred while she was on the way from the institute
meeting place to her place of lodging for the night. She intended to
return to and attend the institute the following day.
In Scott v. Industrial Gomn,51 however, the plaintiff was held not
entitled to compensation for injuries due to slipping on a rail of the
streetcar track on a city street where the accident occurred as plaintiff
was returning to his work after lunch. Here plaintiff was engaged in
work in a city away from his employer's principal place of business but
the court held that he was not exposed to a hazard greater than that to
which the general public was exposed.
In Eagle v. Industrial Commn, 2 plaintiff had made a call in
Bond Hill and was on her way back to Pogues to take care of accumu-
lated business. She paused en route to take her lunch in order to save
time. The court held that when she entered a restaurant of her own
choice (her employer having no control over the premises) for the pur-
pose of getting her lunch, she was not in the course of her employment.
This rule was also applied in Ruddy v. Industrial Comm'n 53 where
a salesman who interrupted his automobile trip to a customer's home by
stopping at a cafe and received an injury on the way from the cafe to
his car which he was entering for the purpose of continuing the business
trip was held not to 'be entitled to compensation. The court said that he
was not in the course of his employment at the time and that the injuries
did not arise out of his employment.
47 Eggers v. Industrial Comm'n, 157 Ohio St. 70, 104 N.E.2d 681 (1952);
Stanfield v. Industrial Comm'n, 146 Ohio St. 583, 67 N.E.2d 446 (1946).
48 Industrial Comm'n v. Nelson, 127 Ohio St. 41, 186 N.E. 735 (1933).
49 Slanina v. Industrial Comm'n, 117 Ohio St. 329, 158 N.E. 829 (1927).
However, the rule is contrary where the employee's duties expose him to some
special danger not common to the public at large. See Industrial Comm'n v.
Carden, 129 Ohio St. 344, 195 N.E. 551 (1935); Industrial Comm'n v. Hampton,
123 Ohio St. 500, 176 N.E. 74 (1931).
50 61 Ohio App. 469, 22 N.E.2d 840 (1939).
5162 Ohio L. Abs. 11, 105 N.E.2d 881 (1951).
82 146 Ohio St. 1, 63 N.E.2d 439 (1945).
53 153 Ohio St. 475, 92 N.E.2d 673 (1950).
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Clearly the courts in Ohio have not gone as far as have the Cali-
fornia courts. There the supreme court held in Wiseman v. Industial
A4cc. Com. that the widow of a banker who died of asphyxiation in a
hotel room was entitled to benefits. The defendant maintained that be-
cause the decedent was occupying the room with one other than his wife
(although registered as his wife) for an immoral purpose and because
the fire originated because of the decedents carelessness (in smoking)
that the injury did not arise out of the decedent's employment and that
the decedent was not in the course of his employment immediately before
and at the time of death. In holding the claim compensable the court,
although recognizing that the decedent was occupying the room for an
unlawful and criminal purpose, ruled that this would not defeat the
claim saying:
[W]here the employee is combining his own business with
that of his employer or attending to both at substantially the
same time, no nice [sic] inquiry will be made as to which
business he was actually engaged in at the time of injury .... 55
There is nothing in the decision to indicate that the rule is confined to
bankers.
Injuries caused by participating in sport activities outside working
hours when the activity is sponsored or actively supported and encouraged
by the employer are injuries arising out of and received during the course
of employment and are compensable. In Ott v. Industrial Comm'n5" the
employee died as a result of an acute cardiac dilation while playing
baseball on a team sponsored by his employer. His death was held to be
compensable. The degree of employer support or sponsorship of the
extra-curricular activity may be most material in determining whether
the injury is compensable.57
ALTERNATIVE OR ADDITIONAL REMEDIES
Except where the employer was required by law to comply with the
546 Cal. 2d 570, 297 P.2d 649 (1956).
55 Id. at 573, 297 P.2d at 651.
5 83 Ohio App. 13, 82 N.E.2d 137 (1948).
5 7 BUREAU OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Important Resolutions, Rules,
Orders and Instructions 7 (Rev. April 1, 1956), reads:
"It is hereby directed that in all cases where the employer encourages the
employees to engage in athletics, either during working hours or outside of working
hours, and supervises and directs, either directly or indirectly, such activities,
meritorious claims for injuries to any such employees while so engaged will be
recognized, the employer's risk and experience to be charged with such cases. In
the event any such employees, while so engaged, receive extra compensation from
the employer, the same shall be included in the payroll reports of this department.
This order shall not apply to employers who do not supervise and direct
either directly or indirectly athletic activities of their employees or do not pay
the employees for the time devoted to athletics."
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act but failed to take out workmen's compensation insurance from the
Industrial Commission5" the Ohio employee does not have alternative
remedies.
5 9
He does, however, have additional remedies. An employee who
receives an injury at work which is covered by the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act and is paid compensation by reason of such injury is still per-
mitted to attempt recovery from a third party which negligently caused
his injury."m Such an action is permitted even though at the time of the
injury -both the third party and the injured party's employer had complied
with the Workmen's Compensation Act."x
After some vascillation the Ohio Supreme Court has held that in
the third party action the amount of workmen's compensation received
by the injured party is not to be deducted from the judgment recovered
against the thira party. 2
However, an employee who is injured at work due to the negligence
of a fellow employee generally is not entitled to recover from the fellow
employee. The Ohio Supreme Court first considered this problem in
Landrum v. Middaugh,' where the plaintiff was injured due to the
negligence of his foreman in starting certain machinery at a time while
plaintiff was in a position of peril. Plaintiff was paid compensation by the
Industrial Commission for his injuries and then filed a civil action against
the foreman. In entering judgment for the foreman the court said that
his acts were the acts of his employer and that he therefore could not be
held liable for those acts. The court noted that the foreman had per-
formed the negligeni acts under the complete control and direction of
his employer, and that the foreman had not acted maliciously, wantonly
or with wilfull intent.
In the case of Morrow v. Hum,64 recovery was permitted in a
58 Onio REV. CODE § 4123.77 (1953).
59 OHIO REv. CODE § 4123.74 (1953) provides: "Employers who comply with
section 4123.35 of the Revised Code shall not be liable to respond in damages at
common law or by statute for any injur', disease, or bodily condition, whether or
not such injury, disease, or bodily condition is compensable under sections 4123.01
to 4123.94, inclusive, of the Revised Code, or for any death resulting from such
injury, disease, or bodily condition of any employee, wherever occurring, during
the period covered by such premium so paid into the state insurance fund, or
during the interval of time in which such employer is permitted to pay such
compensation direct to his injured employees or the dependents of his killed em-
ployees." (Emphasis added.)
6 0 Truscon Steel Co. v. Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co., 120 Ohio St. 394, 166
N.E. 368 (1929); Ohio Pub. Ser. Co. v. Sharkey, 117 Ohio St. 586, 160 N.E.
687 (1928) ; Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co. v. Shachovsky, 111 Ohio St. 791, 146 N.E.
306 (1924).
61 See note 60, supra.
6 2 Truscon Steel Co. v. Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co., supra note 58, reversing
a contrary decision in Ohio Pub. Serv. Co. v. Sharkey, supra note 58.
63 117 Ohio St. 608, 160 N.E. 691 (1927).
6131 Ohio St. 319, 3 N.E.2d 39 (1936).
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wrongful death action against the decedent's fellow employee. Both the
decedent and the defendant were employed by the same company. The
defendant was a vice president in charge of sales and the decedent was a
salesman working under defendant's direction and control. Plaintiff's
decedent was killed when the automobile owned and driven by defendant
was wrecked due to defendant's negligence. At the time of the acci-
dent the parties were enroute from Youngstown to Detroit to meet a
prospective purchaser of products of their employer.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that plaintiff could recover from her
decedent's fellow employee because there were no facts alleged to show
that the employer had any power or right to direct the operation and
control of the automobile. It distinguished the Landrum case on the
ground that there the negligent employee was the alter ego of the em-
ployer whereas in the case at bar the defendant was in a different position
in that he was operating and controlling his own automobile.65
65 The law on the right of an injured employee who has collected Workmen's
Compensation benefits to sue his negligent fellow employee has been left in con-
fusion by the recent supreme court decision in Ellis v. Garwood, 168 Ohio St. 241,
152 N.E.2d 100 (1958). Upon appeal of a ruling on the pleadings the court held
that the New York statute specifically prohibiting such an action did not govern an
injury which occurred in Ohio although both parties were residents of New York
and were working for a New York employer. In this opinion the court seems to
indicate that it is overruling the Landrum v. Middaugh case, supra note 63. In
fact, in a concurring opinion in the Ellis case, Judge Taft expressed the view that
the Morrow v. Hume case had overruled the Landrum case and that the majority
in this opinion should have specifically stated that Landrum v. Middaugh was
overruled. The facts in the case so far as revealed appear to be similar to those
in Morrow v. Hume, suPra note 64.
The court recognized that further consideration would eventually have to be
given by it to this area of the law, saying: "It may well be that a more complete
treatment of the subjects of suits by co-employees who have received compensation
from the State Insurance Fund is merited. It is apparent, however, that such
treatment must be left to a review by this court of a decision wherein there is a
more complete record than that in the instant case which has not passed the
pleading stage." 168 Ohio St. at 247, 152 N.E.2d at 104.
It must, for the present at least, be assumed that the receipt of or eligibility
for workmen's compensation benefits is not a defense available to a negligent
fellow employee, officer or agent of the complying employer. See Gee v. Horvath,
Supreme Court No. 35526, Gongwer Sup. Ct. Rep., March 6, 1958, where the
Court of Appeals for Lucas county refused to allow such a defense to a fellow
employee in an action for a lunch time injury. The motion to certify was dis-
missed by the supreme court on motion filed by the appellee. XXXI Ohio Bar No.
16, April 21, 1958, at 335. However, the Gee case has been returned to the supreme
court by the Lucas County Appellate Court which certified that its decision was in
conflict with another appellate decision. Supreme Court No. 35725, Gongwer Sup.
Ct. Rep., August 2, 1958. Thus, in the early future, we can expect further con-
sideration by the supreme court of this area of the law.
Will not employees demand that their employers indemnify them against such
liability thus in effect resulting in liability to the employer for both workmen's
compensation benefits and common law damages? And if such indemnity cannot
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The injured employee may under certain circumstances be entitled
to collect from his employer a penalty award. The Ohio Constitution6
provides that where an employee's injury, disease or death is due to the
failure of his employer to comply with a specific requirement for the
protection of the lives, health or safety of employees, such employee is
entitled to receive additional compensation."' The additional compen-
sation may not be less than fifteen per cent nor more than fifty per cent
of the maximum award established by law. 68
The Industrial Commission from time to time adopts safety codes 69
which contain many specific safety requirements. On adoption these
codes become orders of the Industrial Commission.
It has been repeatedly held by the Ohio Supreme Court that a
statute enacted by the General Assembly or an order promulgated by the
Industrial Commission which prescribes merely a general course of con-
duct is not a "specific requirement" within the meaning of the constitu-
tional provision.7" It is necessary that the "specific requirement" be of a
character which plainly appraises an employer of his legal obligations
towards his employees and it is not sufficient unless the requirement
demands that some particular and definite act or thing be done.71 To be
sufficient the specific requirement must prescribe such specific safety re-
be secured, will not employees, who witness an accident, now refuse to give evi-
dence needed by the injured employee to establish his compensation claim, fearing
that their knowledge may result in a lawsuit against them, especially if they were
engaged in any way in the work which caused the accident? And will not em-
ployees be threatened with the loss of their life savings unless they obtain insurance
coverage against such personal liability? Indeed, may not some employers look to
a negligent employee for a contribution to a settlement of a compensation claim
giving in return a release from the injured employee which would name not only
the employer but the negligent employee as well?
The court's pronouncement in the Ellis case, supra, which admittedly goes
beyond the issue submitted and which the court says was made when more com-
plete treatment of suits by co-employees was merited, may very well mean the
destruction of the Workmen's Compensation Act itself. It may also have planted
the seed which will destroy the harmony which usually exists between union
members, for with one suing the other strong opinions are sure to be formed and
violent reactions to be expected. Perhaps unions should now offer insurance policies
for their members under a group plan to cover such contingencies.
66 OHIo CONsT. art. II, § 35.
67 Prior to the constitutional amendment in 1923 the words "lawful require-
ment" were used in place of the words "specific requirement."
68 See note 63, supra.
69 E.g., State of Ohio, Specific Requirements and General Safety Standards
of the Industrial Commission of Ohio For Workshops and Factories, Bull. No. 203.
(eff. January 1, 1951).
70 State ex rel. Holdosh v. Industrial Comm'n, 149 Ohio St. 179, 78 N.E.2d
165 (1948) ; State ex rel. Davidson v. Industrial Comm'n, 145 Ohio St. 102, 60
N.E.2d 664 (1945); State ex rel. Rae v. Industrial Comm'n, 136 Ohio St. 168, 24
N.E.2d 594 (1939); State ex rel. Stuber v. Industrial Comm'n, 127 Ohio St. 325,
188 N.E. 526 (1933).
71 State ex rel. Holdosh v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 70.
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quirements as will forewarn the employer and establish a standard which
he may follow.72 A claimant in applying for additional compensation
by reason of his employer having violated a specific requirement can not
rely upon a specific safety requirement which is directed towards some
industry other than that in which his employer was engaged at the time
of the injury."
As noted above, the Ohio Constitution provides that an employee
whose injury is caused by violation of a specific requirement is entitled
to additional compensation which may not be less than fifteen per cent
nor more than fifty per cent of the "maximum award established by
law. " 74 In State ex rel. Engel v. Industrial Comm'n7 this statutory
language was interpreted. Although sufficient facts were not presented
to the court to enable it to specifically apply the language to the case
presented, the court's decision makes it clear that the language is to be
given its full intent. For example, if an employee whose average weekly
wage for the year prior to the injury amounted to $45.00 were totally
disabled for one hundred weeks, he would receive $3,000 in compen-
sation (100 x 2/3 of his $45.00 average weekly wage or $30.00). The
statutory maximum weekly compensation is $40.25,76 but to receive the
maximum the employee's average weekly wage must amount to $60.38
or more. If the employee were awarded an additional fifty per cent
for violation by his employer of a specific safety requirement, he would
receive one hundred weeks at $20.122, this being fifty per cent of
$40.25, the maximum award established by law. His award for the
violation then would be $2012.50 which is $512.50 more than fifty
per cent of the compensation he would receive for his total disability.
Any penalty award is to be paid by the employer directly even
though he is insured by the State Fund. If it is paid by the State Fund,
the particular employer's premium is increased in an amount equal to the
award. 77 In other words, it is not possible to insure this liability.
At one time an employee who was disabled because of his employ-
ment but was not entitled to workmen's compensation benefits since his
disability was not covered by the act could bring a personal injury action
against his employer. 78 The act was amended in 1939 to prohibit such
action." This amendment has been applied to prohibit recovery by a
72 State ex rel. Rae v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 70.
73 State ex rel. Miller Plumbing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 149 Ohio St. 493,
79 N.E.2d 553 (1948).
74 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 35.
75 142 Ohio St. 425, 52 N.E.2d 743 (1944).
76 OHIO REv. CODE § 4123.57 (Baldwin Supp. 1958).
77 See note 74, supra.
7 8 Weil v. Taxicabs of Cincinnati, 139 Ohio St. 198, 39 N.E.2d 148 (1942);
Triff v. National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co., 135 Ohio St. 191, 20 N.E.2d
232 (1939).
79The prohibition is now contained in OHIO REV. CODE § 4123.74 (1953).
See note 59, supra.
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wife of an injured employee in an action against an employer s° and to
prohibit recovery by a husband in an action against the employer where
his wife received a compensable injury.8 1
A personal injury action cannot be maintained by the employee
against his employer even if the employer fails to report an injury
thereby causing the employee to have his rights under the Workmen's
Compensation Act barred by the statute of limitations. In Greenwalt v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., s the court held that a demurrer to plain-
tiff's petition had been properly sustained although the petition alleged
that the defendant employer gratuitously offered to file a claim with
the Industrial Commission for its employee, the plaintiff, and failed to
do so within the time required by the statute of limitations. The petition
characterized the failure as "wilfull and fraudulent" and charged that it
was for the specific purpose of defeating plaintiff's claim.
INTERACTION BETWEEN COURT AND LEGISLATURE
History of 1937 Amendment from Malone to Dripps
Prior to 1937 such definition of injury, as existed, appeared in
General Code section 1465-68"s and read: "Every employee . . . who is
injured, and the dependents of such as are killed in the course of em-
ployment, wheresoever such injury has occurred, provided the same was
not purposely self-inflicted . . . shall be paid compensation. .... 84
In 1937 the act was amended adding the following paragraph to
General Code section 1465-68: "The term 'injury' as used in this section
and in the Workmen's Compensation Act shall include any injury re-
ceived in the course of and arising out of the injured employee's
employment." 5
There is nothing in the added language to indicate that a revo-
lutionary change was intended by the legislature. Many, however, have
assumed that the language added by the 1937 amendment read: "The
term 'injury' shall include any injury"; or that the language read:
"The term 'injury' shall include any injury whether caused by accidental
means or where only accidental in result." In other words, many have
assumed that the legislature intended to broaden the definition of the
word "injury."
A careful analysis will show that the 1937 amendment, in fact,
80 156 Ohio St. 295, 102 N.E.2d 444 (1951).
81 Calhoon v. Youngstown Pressed Steel Co., No. 901, App. Ct. Trumbull
county, Ohio, 1936; Grinstead v. A. & P., No. 29589, C.P. Ct. Lake county, Ohio,
1956.
82 164 Ohio St. 1, 128 N.E.2d 116 (1955).
83 103 Ohio Laws 72, 79; 111 Ohio Laws 218, 220.
8 4 This provision is now contained in OHio REV. CODE § 4123.54 (1953).
85 117 Ohio Laws 109. Since the revision of the Code, this definition has
appeared in OHIO REV. CODE § 4123.01(C) (1953).
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added a new requirement. Before the amendment the phrase "and
arising out of" did not appear in the act, although the phrase "in the
course of" did. However, the courts in defining "injury" had since the
inception of the act used both phrases joined by the conjunction "and.""6
It is submitted therefore that the legislature by its 1937 amendment was
codifying, confirming or ratifying the definition of "injury" which had
appeared in the cases since the inception of the workmen's compen-
sation law.
Those who thought the 1937 amendment constituted a revolutionary
change in the law were encouraged by the Supreme Court's decision in
1942 in Malone v. Industrial Comm'n.s7 Plaintiff's son, a foundry
worker, collapsed at work and died the same day as a result of heat
exhaustion brought about because he was exposed to temperatures of 113
degrees when the outside temperature was 90 degrees. It was maintained
by the Industrial Commission that the decedent had voluntarily sub-
jected himself to the heat of the place where he was working and that
he was performing his normal work. In its opinion the supreme court
said:
To restate the rule under the present statute, the term "in-
jury" as used in the Workmen's Compensation Act, compre-
hends a physical or traumatic damage or harm, accidental in its
origin and character in the sense of being the result of a sudden
mishap occurring by chance, unexpectedly and not in the usual
course of events, at a particular time and place.
88
Notwithstanding this pronouncement the court made it clear that the
claim was compensable when considered in the light of its prior decisions,
saying: "The fact is that scores of compensable accidental injuries result
where no accidental circumstance precedes or causes them. Many such
injuries have been recognized as compensable by this court."8 9 However,
in its opinion the court also stated: "This court is still committed to the
proposition that a compensable injury under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act must be accidental and traumatic in character."
90
It is submitted therefore that the Malone case, although containing
86 See Industrial Comm'n v. Lewis, 125 Ohio St. 296, 181 N.E. 136 (1932);
Fassig v. State ex rel. Turner, 95 Ohio St. 232, 116 N.E. 104 (1917).
87 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E.2d 266 (1942).
ssId. at 300, 43 N.E.2d at 270-71.
8 1d. at 298, 43 N.E.2d at 270. The court cited as examples: Kaiser v.
Industrial Comm'n, 136 Ohio St. 440, 26 N.E.2d 449 (1940) ; Industrial Comm'n v.
Bartholome, 128 Ohio St. 13, 190 N.E. 193 (1934); Spicer Mfg. Co. v. Tucker,
127 Ohio St. 421, 188 N.E. 870 (1934); Industrial Comm'n v. Palmer, 126 Ohio St.
251, 185 N.E. 66 (1933) ; Industrial Comm'n v. Weimer, 124 Ohio St. 50, 176 N.E.
886 (1931) ; Industrial Comm'n v. Polcen, 121 Ohio St. 377, 169 N.E. 305 (1929)
Industrial Comm'n v. Roth, 98 Ohio St. 34, 120 N.E. 172 (1918).
96Id. at 300, 43 N.E.2d at 271.
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a discussion of the amendment of 1937, was at most a reassertion that
when an employee is subjected to a greater hazard than are members of
the general public by reason of the activities, conditions, and require-
ments of his employment and such hazard results in disability to the
employee, then he will be considered to have been accidentally injured.
Excessive heat then, even though not unusual in the particular employee's
occupation, was added to other previously recognized hazards such as
contact from deleterious gases, destructive temperatures or forces of
nature. In other words, the Malone case demonstrates that the coverage
of the act was not decreased by the 1937 amendment.
The decisions since the amendment of 1937, both those prior and
subsequent to the Malone case, clearly indicate that the court in the
Malone case did not overnight adopt a new concept of injury. Had the
court intended otherwise, it would have had to specifically overrule
Matczak v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,91 Industrial Gomin'n v.
Franken,92 and other similar decisions.
Only in this way can the Malone case ,be reconciled not only with
the Dripps case 3 but also with the Artis case. 4 If these three cases can-
not be so reconciled then the following comment of Judge Taft made
in his concurring opinion of the Dripps case must stand:
91 139 Ohio St. 181, 338 N.E.2d 1021 (1942). See discussion pp. 556-58, supra.
92 126 Ohio St. 299, 185 N.E. 199 (1933).
93 165 Ohio St. 407, 135 N.E.2d 873 (1956). See discussion pp. 555-57, suapra.
94 165 Ohio St. 412, 135 N.E.2d 877 (1956). See discussion pp. 556-57, supra.
This is substantially the position taken by the Tuscarawas Court of Appeals in
Picchetti v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 105 Ohio App. 514, 518 (1957), where the
court said:
"This instruction goes to the vital question in this case as to whether the
inhalation of poisonous gas constitutes an accidental injury. No citation of au-
thority is needed to support the proposition that if the instruction was proper a
refusal to give it was prejudicial error no matter what the court said in its general
charge. The argument around the instruction concerns whether the case of Dripps
v. Industrial Commission, 165 Ohio St., 407, 135 N.E. (2d), 873, overrules the case
of Malone v. Industrial Commission, 140 Ohio St., 292, 43 N.E. (2d), 266. While
Judge Taft in his concurring opinion in the Dripps case thinks it does, the court
does not so hold, and it is inconceivable to this writer that they would not have
done so, in view of Judge Taft's opinion which was available to the court before
the syllabus was written, if they had concurred therein. Consequently, as we view
it, the Malone case is still the law of Ohio.
"In the case of Sebek v. Cleveland Graphite Bronze Co., 148 Ohio St., 693, at
page 696, 76 N.E. (2d), 892, it is stated:
'This court has held in a number of cases that bodily harm, which occurs to
a workman by the sudden, unexpected and unforeseen inhalation of noxious or
poisonous gases or fumes, or by contact with a poisonous substance, constitutes a
compensable injury within the meaning of the provisions of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act of Ohio. In such a situation, compensation is awarded on the basis
of the injury and not for the disability or disease which may be attributable
thereto. Industrial Commission v. Roth, 98 Ohio St., 34, 120 N.E., 172, 6 A.L.R.,
1463: Industrial Commission v. Burckard, 112 Ohio St., 372, 147 N.E., 81; Industrial
Commission v. Palmer, 126 Ohio St., 251, 185 N.E., 66; Industrial Commission v.
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As I view it, to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith
Malone v. Industrial Commission ... and Maynard v. B. F.
Goodrich Co. . . . are being overruled by the decision and
paragraph one of the syllabus of the instant case. I believe
therefore that some such statement should be made in para-
graph one of the syllabus herein to avoid confusing those courts
which are required to follow and those lawyers who rely upon
the decisions and pronouncements of law made by this court."
In any event, the pronouncement of the court in the Dripps case
has terminated further debate as to the meaning of the 1937 amend-
ment and has provided a clear explanation of what constitutes a compen-
sable injury.
INCLINATION OF THE SUPREME COURT AS COMPARED
WITH THE LOWER COURTS AND THE COMMISSION
The supreme court has said that the provisions of the workmen's
compensation law are to be construed liberally in favor of the injured
workmen seeking benefits thereunder. 6 The writer submits that while
the court has construed the act liberally, its decisions and opinions have
shown a consistency from the beginning of the act. Compare the numer-
ous times it has used language which was used in its prior -decisions and
has cited its prior cases.
Lawsuits oftentimes are commenced because of differences between
the parties over the interpretation of the facts and because of differences
over the application of the law and the facts. For this same reason it is
only to be expected that a great variety of decisions will be found among
the trial courts and various courts of appeal. Almost without exception,
however, this is not due to the failure of the lower courts to follow the
law as pronounced by the supreme court but due to the manner in which
the law is applied to the facts under consideration or in the manner the
facts are interpreted to bring them under the law.
That the lower courts consistently follow the supreme court's in-
terpretations of the workmen's compensation law is demonstrated by
the number of times they have followed the Dripps case."7 Since that
decision in July 1956 there have been at least four reported lower court
Helriggle, 126 Ohio St., 645, 186 N.E., 711; Industrial Commission v. Bartholome,
128 Ohio St., 13 190 N.E., 193; 42 Ohio Jurisprudence, 649, Section 64.'
"We likewise think that this pronouncement is still the law of Ohio."
95 See note 93, supra at 410-11, 135 N.E.2d at 876.
96 State ex rel. Jackson v. Industrial Comm'n, 167 Ohio St. 290, 147 N.E.2d'
666 (1958) ; Bowling v. Industrial Comm'n, 145 Ohio St. 23, 60 N.E.2d 479 (1945) ;
Industrial Comm'n v. Weigandt, 102 Ohio St. 1, 130 N.E. 38 (1921); Industrial
Comm'n v. Pora, 100 Ohio St. 218, 125 N.E. 662 (1919). See also Davidson v.
Industrial Comm'n, 52 Ohio L. Abs. 194, 82 N.E.2d 866 (1947); 42 OHIo JuR.
Iforkmen's Compensation § 5, at 578-79.
97 See note 93, supra.
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decisions considering the Dripps decision."8 In each of these decisions the
lower court has held that claimant did not receive a compensable injury
since it was not an accidental injury.
In the earliest of these cases there was testimony that plaintiff's
decedent while performing his usual work as an elevator operator was
seen leaving his elevator in a falling position." Death resulted from the
fall. The appellate court said that the sole question before it was whether
decedent has suffered an accidental injury. After considering the Dripps
case it reversed the judgment which had been entered for plaintiff and
entered judgment for the Industrial Commission.
More recently the Hamilton County Court of Appeals considered
a case where the testimony indicated that decedent, while stooping to lift
a pail of oil and water weighing twenty to thirty pounds, became dis-
abled.' 0 Medical testimony offered at the trial indicated that a week
after the incident the employee died from a subarachnoid hemorrhage
caused by the disability. After discussing the Drips case the court con-
cluded that it could find no distinction between the material facts in that
case and the case at bar; therefore, it reversed the judgment which had
been recovered by plaintiff and entered judgment for the Industrial Com-
mission. In doing so the court recognized that its holding was contrary
to one of its own decisions. 0 ' which had been decided prior to the Driips
case.
, Also, after the Driips decision the Franklin County Appellate Court
had before it a workmen's compensation case where plaintiff suffered
a subarachnoid hemorrhage while parking a Cadillac automobile in a
small stall in a garage where he was employed.' The evidence offered
at the trial indicated that the car had steered hard, that in order to back
it into the stall claimant had been required to keep his foot on the brake
on the left side, to lean over to the right side of the automobile as far as
possible and to twist his body and head to the rear in order to see the
clearance in the parking space, thus requiring greater effort than usual.
While so working claimant was stricken. In entering a judgment for the
Industrial Commission the court stated that in the case at bar, just as in
the Dripps case, there was no evidence of an accidental injury by external
means resulting from some specific event or mishap. This same court
recently entered another judgment for the Industrial Commission in a
98 Cartwright v. General Motors Corp., 78 Ohio L. Abs. 449 (Franklin
county App. 1958) ; Long v. Industrial Comm'n, 149 N.E.2d 922 (Hamilton county
App. 1957); White v. Industrial Comm'n, 4 Ohio Op. 2d 395, 149 N.E.2d 40
(1957) ; Miller v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Ohio L. Abs. 100, 145 N.E.2d 490 (1956).
09 Miller v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 98.
100 Long v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 98.
101 Williams v. Industrial Comm'n, 95 Ohio App. 275, 119 N.E.2d 126 (1953).
102 White v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 98.
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case... where the employee felt a sudden pain in his back while in a
stooped position carrying a pot of paint.
10 4
The writer in his personal experience has found that Deputy Ad-
ministrators, regional boards, and the Industrial Commission, are as
conscientious as the lower courts in applying the law as pronounced by
the supreme court. Fortunately, it is only on rare occasions that one en-
counters a hearing officer who recognizes the law, but refuses to follow
it. The complaint, if there be any, is usually one of misapplication.
103 Cartwright v. General Motors Corp., supra note 98.
104 After the Dripps decision the Mahoning County Court of Appeals held in
the unreported case of Davis v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. that an employee had
received a compensable back injury since his disability occurred when he was
required to exert greater pressure than usual to remove a tire from the collapsable
drum upon which the tire was being built. The court in a split decision dis-
tinguished the Dripps case on the ground that the "unusual event" which is re-
quired by the Dripps case was the failure of the drum to break down thereby
causing the tire to stick. Gongwer State Rep. 10980. On April 23, 1958 the
Ohio Supreme Court allowed a motion to certify this case. XXXI Ohio Bar
No. 17, at 363. Its decision will not be rendered before this article is published.
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